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SOME IMPRESSIONS O F  MARTIN E. MARTY'S PAPER: 
·'LOCATING CONSENT AND DISSENT IN AMERICAN RELIGION" 
by 
Tad Clements 
There cannot be much ground for reasonable doubt thal Lhe area marked off 
for consideration by Martin Marty is one of fundamental importance. To 
practical men and lo certain scholars as well (e.g., sociologists and historians) 
the forces that lend to increase or decrease concord or dissent in American life 
are of great concern. Indeed, whether we ourselves are consciously concerned or 
not over such forces, the fact remains Lhal such forces are of fundamental 
importance, for no one's life is unaffected by them. 
There are, however, a number of questions which Dr. Marty's paper raises 
and l shall address myself Lo a few of t.hese. The question I shall attempt to 
answer is: Has Dr. Marty properly located and identified the major forces of 
consent and dissent? To answer this question adequately might require carefully 
done, lengthy historical and sociological analyses. Tl1ese analyses I will not 
altempt (not so much because of limitations of space as because o f  limitations 
imposed by my own background: I am neither a sociologist nor an historfan, 
but rather simply a philosopher). However, the philosopher is not without his 
own methods of investigation and it may be that conceptual clarification and 
criticism are at least as important as careful historical and sociological analyses 
in answering the question. Whether this is so or not I leave to your judgment. 
But whatever your judgment, it hardly seems likely that you will doubt that, 
if it can be attained, conceptual clarity is preferable to conceptual vagueness 
and confusion or that truth claims and value judgments which can withstand 
rigorous criticisms are preferable to any which appear to be dubious. So, this 
response will have some value in any case, if it js well done. 
Let us begin then, by noting some of Dr. Marty's claims in an attempt to be 
clear about their meaning and their status as truth claims and valuations. He 
begins by quoting part of the Supreme Court decision in the Zorach v. Clauson 
case of 195 1-the asserlion that "We are a religious people whose institutions 
presuppose a Supreme Being". Of this assertion he says: "While the last clause 
of that dictum . . .  may not be a demonstrable proposition, the first half of the 
sentence is." 
Now it will be my contention that even the first half of that sentence is 
demonstrable, if at all, only if there is agreement on what is to be meant by 
being a "religious" people. Indeed, there is no acceptable way, as far as I can see, 
in which the truth or falsehood of such a putative asse-rtion could even 
conceivably (i.e., in principle or in term!; of theoretical possibility) be shown to 
be plausible, let alone demonstrated as probable or certain unless clear and 
acceptable meanings can be establistcd for "religious" and its cognate terms. 
And it will be my contention thal Dr. Marty has nol given us a clear and 
acceptable meaning for this term or its cognates. 
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Lel it be noted. as a beginning, thaL Dr. Marl� docs nol allempt lo define 
these terms in his paper. In lhe absence of precise definitions for such terms. 
how does Dr. �larLy give his readers an impression of the meaning he intends lo 
attach to them? I call the reader's attenlion to the paragraph on page one of 
his paper where he refers to the '·impressive observallons concerning the 
enduring religious character of lhe Americun people". These are, apparently. 
meant to illustrate typical, or perhaps even outstanding, facts about the religious 
character or lhe American people. Without repeating him at length here, I 
simply ask you to consider whether or not ull of the things he mentions (e.g .• 
church allendance. money spenl on church buildings, rererence lo "Godl" on 
our coins, etc.) might be found in a secularized society which, due lo cuLtural 
inPtlia, retains many symbols and rituals largely as emply forms, i.e., forms 
no longer associated wit.h any deep, abiding ("enduring" in Marty's usage) 
sentiments. Even if "all" ls too strong, my poinl is, I think, slill well taken. What 
constilut.es lbeing "religiotls"? Need it be conceived in terms of such practices as 
I.hose he mentions? If so, what of the prophetic rebel who is either indifferent 
to or even actively opposed to such ritualisli<' forms? And note that some of 
lhe most. influential individuals t.hroughoul religious history have been just such 
prophetic rebels. 
Nor does Dr. Marty clear up the difficulty by claiming, as he does on page 
two of his paper: '·The great religions have tended to be coextensive with lhe 
borders of states or cultures, and provided rationales for the polillca l and 
personal life of their members. Even in modern pluralistic society . . .  religion 
can serve on a voluntary basis lo help them (citizens) siluale themselves in 
patt.erns of meaning and acceptance." This does not assist us in clarifying wbal 
is to be understood by the term "religious"; because even if this claim is 
acceptable-which I think l can show it is not-the coextensiveness of religions 
and cultures which Marty suggest,s, whatever the terms "religion" and "culture" 
may be taken to mean, might simply be a result of the fact that religion is 
conceived, in many cases at least, as an aspect or component of culture. In 
other words, lo lhe extenl that this coextensiveness were taken to be fact, the 
truth assert.ing it might well be analytic in nature. 
ln any case, even if religions are coextensive with cultures, whal precisely is 
this "religion" which is coextensi\1e with culture? Even if 'A' and 'B' are 
correlated, I.his does not, of itself, tell us the nature of 'A' or 'B'. 
Are we perhaps given some further clue to the meaning of this term in 
Marty's claim that. religions have "provided rationales for the polilical and 
personal Life" or the people involved in states and cultures, that religions help 
people 41sit.uate themselves in patterns of meaning and acceptance"? Not really, 
for as we all know, many sorts of things, quite differer\t and even antithetical 
to each other, can, in some sense or other, serve such funcllons. Many sorts of 
economic theories, political ideologies, superstitious belief systems (such as 
Astrology and Palmistry), etc. can, in one way or another, attain these goals 
for individuals and social groups. Are we to consider aH of these diverse 
phenomena religious? If  so, where are lhe limits of lhe concepts? What does it 
exclude? 
154 3
Clements: Some Impressions of Martin E. Marty's Paper: "Locating Consent an
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1972
TAD CLEMENTS 
'l'hese quesLions bring me to what I consider to be the greatest. conceptual 
difficulty posed by Dr. Marty's paper. As difficull as it may be to pin down the 
notion of "denominational religion,, involved in Dr. Marty's paper. we are all at 
least vaguely aware of its applicability. For instance, if someone were to ask us 
whether the Su nday services taking place al the corner Methodist Church are 
religious, in lhe denominational sense intended by Marty, we could, probably 
wiLhoul an) reasonable hesitation. give an affirmative answer. So that. even 
though Lhe boundaries of the concept are unclear. there are certain Ob\•ious cases 
which are easily recognizable. And iL might be possible, by means of some 
precising stipulations, to quite clearly demarcate denominational religion from 
secular concerns. But any such endeavor is apparently doomed lo failure, be­
cause Dr. Marty finds it necessary Lo thoroughly conflate the seculnt· and the 
religious. For, in order to localize concord and give this locus a religious 
dimension, he proceeds lo speak ot:' secular practices as a peculiar kind of 
religion. For I.his purpose he employs such designations as "Conventional 
Consensus Religion", "Lay Religion", Folk Religion", "Generalized Religion", 
"Societal Religion", "Nalional Religion" and "Civil Religion". Under such 
rubrums he i!; able to include any social realities which can "all:ract the ullimale 
concerns of ill:> adherents" and which possess "olhel' characte:ristic features of 
religion." 1 call your attention to lhe characteristic features of "'Civil Religions" 
lo which Dr. Marty refers, e.g., myths. symbols, creeds, ceremonies, etc. Is it 
nol clear that if all the widely shared beliefs, attitudes, symbols and practices 
occurring in American sociely are reforred lo as "religious" that lerm will be in· 
dist.inguishable rrom "the secular"? And i f  this be allowed, t.hen surely great con­
ceptual confusion results. For in this case any society, all the way from a theo­
cracy to an atheistic society. becomes. in this sense (the sense invol\'ed in 
.. National Religion'» religious. ln other words, in some c&ses al least, the 
religious (in the sense or "Civil Religion") will mean the anti-religious (in the 
sense of "Denominational Religion"), so that in these cases, a creed, practi<:e, 
Ne. will be both religious and nol religious (bul o f  course not in lhe same sense). 
There is, of course, no reason why Marty's stipulations could noL be accepted, 
if our only interest is purely logical. As long as we kept our distmclions in mind 
and uniformly used the proper adjectives-"denominational" or "Civil"-we 
probably would not find ourselves mired in conf1Us1on on this score. Where the 
c.·onfusion arises is nol so much between the two senses or religion, even though 
both am in need of further clarification; the confusion is primarily created by 
Marty's use of the word "religion" Lo refer Lo what has usually been referred to 
as "the culture" or "the ethos" of a social group. These latter terms are, as 
generally used, wider than and (in many cases) essentially different from what is 
usually understood by Lhe terms "religion" and "religious." In terms of general 
usage, both amotl!! social scientists and other scholars, the terms "culture" and 
"ethos", which seem lo cover the characteristics Dr. Marty discusses in describ· 
i:ng Civil or National religion. have r.o necessary reference to the concepts ot' 
'"religion" or "the religious''. Thus, as it appears to me, he has simply offered us 
a new name, in which is incorporated the word ''religion" (along with some of 
its emolional i f  not inlellectu�I associations) for phenomena which arc more 
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adequate!} (because more neutrally and more precisely defined) designated by 
the terms .. culture" or "ethos". 
lf it is nol quite clear what is to be underslood by "religion" in eilhtr sense 
or how al least one of those senses is to be distinguished from "lhe secular" or 
"non-religious". what are we lo make of Dr. f\tarty's allempt to locate tonsent 
and dissent in American religion? 
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